India’s strategy and what we can expect from its BRICS presidency in 2026
Stephan Ossenkopp
On January 1, 2026, one of the founding members of the BRICS group of countries, India, will take over the chairmanship of the alliance. Although it is still too early to take stock of exactly what we can expect, there are at least some indications. The summit of heads of state and government will, of course, take place in the capital New Delhi, but around 100 other events, including ministerial meetings, round tables, and working groups, will be held in all 28 Indian states. Events will be held in 60 cities as part of the BRICS summit, including Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Chandigarh, Ahmedabad, and Lucknow. The exact list is still awaited from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Representatives from eleven member states—including Saudi Arabia—and ten partner countries will come to India for the summit. According to informed sources, the summit of heads of state is planned for August or September. Two meetings of foreign ministers, a meeting of national security advisors, and 20 meetings of various ministries are planned. In addition, 90 different working and expert groups are to meet. Chambers of commerce and parliamentarians will also exchange views on the BRICS formats.
A key concern will be the exchange on economic and financial cooperation. The chairman of the Indian Business Council in Russia, Akashdeep Singh, recently commented on the possible agenda in an article. All attention will be focused on how economic cooperation between the member states will be structured. Looking at the cooperation between India and Russia as an example, trade has already multiplied. “This applies not only to the Russian side with its oil and natural gas, but also to the Indian side. We are seeing many industries, including new industries and companies, coming to Russia. This is excellent news,” Singh told the Think BRICS platform. He considers logistics hubs and payment systems to be even more important for smoother trade. One of the most pressing issues is the integration of India’s UPI with Russia’s MIR system. UPI (Unified Payment Interface) allows transactions between banks and individuals and already accounts for 50% of all digital transfers worldwide (250 billion transactions annually). MIR Pay belongs to the Russian Central Bank. Linking the two systems could circumvent Western sanctions.
More trade beyond BRICS
The increasingly close cooperation between India and the Russian Federation will certainly be a driving force for India’s BRICS presidency in 2026. Several elements come together here. At the end of November 2025, an 18-month roadmap for a joint free trade zone between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was signed. India wants to open up new markets due to the high US tariffs on Indian goods. In addition to Russia, the EAEU also includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The partnership with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is also to be intensified. A trade agreement is under discussion. In addition to the BRICS country South Africa, the SACU also includes Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Eswatini. India is also pursuing the second phase of an agreement with Mercosur, which centers on BRICS member Brazil, as well as other members such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It is noteworthy that India’s Trade Minister Piyush Goyal announced an increase in Indian exports year-on-year at a press conference on November 25, 2025, despite the hurdles and barriers imposed by the US. “Our Indian companies, our Indian exporters are resilient, they are confident, and they are capable of facing challenges,” Goyal said confidently.
India and Russia
Another milestone is the opening of the Russian-Indian Trade Center in New Delhi. In 2024, the trade volume between Russia and India rose to US$70 billion. The trade center is intended to further strengthen cooperation in the areas of energy production, agriculture, and the pharmaceutical industry. At the beginning of December, the Russia-India Summit took place in the Indian capital. There, a comprehensive economic cooperation program was agreed upon, to run until 2030. The next target is a trade volume of US$100 billion by 2030. As far as sea routes are concerned, the maritime corridor between the ports of Chennai in southeastern India and Vladivostok in the Russian Far East is one of the high-priority projects. According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, it is an integral part of Russian-Indian discussions. The port of Chabahar in Iran – also a BRICS country – completes the route. India has recently invested heavily in the port – despite all Western sanctions. Iran is also accessible by land from Russia. On November 8, a freight train carrying 62 containers from the region north of Moscow reached a dry port near Tehran – via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Geostrategic analysts such as Binoy Basnyat see this not only as a moderate logistical success, but also as a breakthrough in the fundamental realignment of Eurasian trade geography.
New member Thailand?
When it comes to the question of admitting new members to the BRICS group, different speeds are preferred. Since decisions must always be made unanimously, some fear that reaching consensus could become significantly more difficult if new members are admitted too quickly. While the 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa decided to admit five new members, the 2024 summit in Kazan admitted only one additional member, Indonesia, and created the category of partner countries. No new members were added at the summit in Brazil in 2025. Will that change at the upcoming meeting in India? Thailand has explicitly asked India for support for full membership. At least, that was the message in a statement following the meeting between Thai foreign minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow and Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in early December 2025. Thailand was one of the countries that accepted partner status in 2025, having already joined the so-called BRICS Plus mechanism in 2017, which China had launched primarily to integrate countries of the Global South into the BRICS.
Multipolar India
Conclusion: India’s strategy is to rise to become a globally and multipolarity networked trading power. On the one hand, New Delhi does not want to sever its good relations with the US and other Western powers. This is also evident in the fact that India and the US will resume negotiations on December 10 to settle the tariff dispute initiated by US President Trump. At the same time, India, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in particular, is making it clear with the expansion of trade relations with Russia and his personal friendship with Russian President Putin that it will not join the stance of parts of the West in wanting to fight Russia to defeat. Modi’s smoothing of the waves between India and China at the BRICS summit in Russia in 2024 and at the summit of heads of state and government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tianjin in August 2025 is also a key strategic element. The acceleration of the expansion of relations with the Global South is particularly evident in the cooperation with Mercosur and the South African regional alliance. There is also to be a year of maritime cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2026. All these elements combine to paint a picture of India seeking to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the rise of Eurasia, Southeast Asia, and the Global South in order to become a polycentric hub of trade itself. This will certainly dominate the agenda of the upcoming BRICS summit at the 60 Indian venues.
Stephan Kemal Ossenkopp is a web-journalist and a researcher at Schiller Institute in Germany.
This article was published on December 7, 2025, in ‘Die Multipolare Welt’ and has been translated into English and Turkish with the author’s permission.
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